to which we shall find ourselves led
upon other, and philosophical grounds. But as the prejudices which,
during several centuries, have been gradually congregating around the
science of education are so many and so powerful, every legitimate
means, and this among others, should be combined for the purpose of
removing them.

CHAP. III.

_How Nature may be imitated in Communicating Knowledge to the Pupil, by
the Reiteration of Ideas._

The phenomenon in mechanics and natural philosophy, which is popularly
termed "Suction," may be exhibited in a thousand different ways, and yet
all are the result of but one cause. When we witness the various
phenomena of the air and common pump,--the barometer and the cupping
glass,--the sipping of our tea, and the traversing of an insect on the
mirror or the roof,--the operations appear so very dissimilar, that we
are ready to attribute them to the action of a variety of agents. But it
is not so;--for when we trace each of them back to its primitive cause,
we find that each and all of these wonders are produced by the weight of
the atmosphere, and _that alone_. In precisely the same manner,
knowledge may apparently be communicated to the human mind in a thousand
different ways; and yet, when we examine each, and trace it to its
primitive cause, we find the phenomenon to be one--and _one alone_. The
truth has been received and lodged with the memory,--made part of our
knowledge--by _the reiteration of its idea_ by the mind itself;--by an
exercise of active, voluntary thought upon the knowledge thus
communicated. The cause and the effect invariably follow each other both
in old and young; for whenever a new idea is perceived and reiterated by
the pupil,--if it should be but once,--the knowledge of the child is to
that extent increased; but whenever this act of the mind is awanting,
there can be no additional information received;--the increase of
knowledge is found to be impossible. This appears to be a law of our
Nature, to which we know of no exception.

It is also worthy of remark here, that the retention or permanence of
the ideas thus committed to the keeping of the memory depends upon two
circumstances. The first is, the vigour of the mental powers, or the
intensity of the impression made upon them at the time of
reiteration;--and the second, and certainly the principal circumstance,
is the frequency of their reiteration by the mind. In evidence of the
first we see, that