makes again the conventional distinctions between
faculties appropriate to philosophy and to poetry. His discussion of the
function of judgment is, if anything, more conventional within the
boundaries of neoclassic criticism than is his view of the imagination.
Its typical role as concerned with the "disposition of materials" has a
pedigree extending backward to Hobbes and the critical climate of the
early years of Restoration England. Principally, Ogilvie is eager to
assert that the poet is as judicious as the philosopher, by which,
however, he does not intend to put forth a view of the cognitive
function of the poet, but rather the justice with which he paints the
passions. Essentially, therefore, Ogilvie's distinction between poet and
philosopher is for the sake of distinguishing between the former's
greater interest in the passions, the latter's more proper concern with
the reason. Once again there is nothing unusual in his treatment of the
subject at this time, with the possible exception that Ogilvie's
conception of the imagination is not so comprehensive as that being
developed by Alexander Gerard, William Duff, and some of the other
contemporary associatioassociationistsnlsts. In order, however, to
emphasize the importance of imagination, by which he largely means the
imagistic liveliness of the poet's mind, he allows that the imagination
is secondary only in didactic or ethical poetry. Such forms are perhaps
best understood as hybrid, a kind of poetizing of philosophy, a sort of
reasoning in verse, and therefore forms in which the imagination is not
given full exercise. Given his premises it is not surprising that
Ogilvie often emphasizes ornamentation or imagistic display and supports
his position by conceiving of the modern lyric as descended from the
religiously consecrated ode. The sublime and exuberant imagery of the
latter exists reductively as an important virtue of the present lyric.

As Ogilvie develops his argument in the second letter, it is apparent
also that the imagination functions as that faculty which best
contemplates the sublime and the wonderful. The imagination is thus
contemplative and expressive, and both functions are justified through
the passions that admiration evokes. In sum, the imagination is evoked
by the passions, a proposition which suggests why, for Ogilvie, the
characteristic mark of genius is a highly animated sensibility. It is
apparent also that Ogilvie's criteria include sy