will necessarily disappear from the world.
He had so successfully subordinated his own emotions, that in his
philosophical system he calmly ignores passion as a mainspring of human
activity. This is exemplified by the rule he lays down for the regulation
of a man's conduct to his fellow-beings. He must always measure their
respective worth, and not the strength of his affection for them, even if
the individuals concerned be his near relations. Supposing, for example,
he had to choose between saving the life of a Fenelon and that of a
chambermaid, he must select the former because of his superior talents,
even though the latter should be his mother or his wife. Affections are
to be forgotten in the calculations of reason. Godwin's faith in the
supremacy of the intellect was not lessened because he was forced to
admit that men often do not act reasonably. This is, he explains, because
they are without knowledge of the absolute truth. Show them what is true
or right, and all, even the most abandoned criminal, will give up what is
false or wrong. Logic is the means by which the regeneration of mankind
is to be effected. Reason is the dynamite by which the monopoly of rank
is to be shattered. "Could Godwin," Leslie Stephen very cleverly says,
"have caught Pitt, or George III., or Mrs. Brownrigg, and subjected them
to a Socratic cross-examination, he could have restored them to the paths
of virtue, as he would have corrected an error in a little boy's sums."

Men, Godwin taught, can never know the truth so long as human laws exist;
because when subject to any control, good, bad, or indifferent, they are
not free to reason, and hence their actions are deprived of their only
legitimate inspiration. Arguing from these premises, his belief in the
necessity of the abolition of all forms of government, political and
social, and his discouragement of the acquirement of habits, were
perfectly logical. Had he confined himself to general terms in expressing
his convictions, his conclusions would not have been so startling.
Englishmen were becoming accustomed to theories of reform. But always
just and uncompromising, he unhesitatingly defined particular instances
by which he illustrated the truth of his teaching, thus making the ends
he hoped to achieve clearer to his readers. He boldly advanced the
substitution of an appeal to reason for punishment in the treatment of
criminals, and this at a time when such a doctrine was considered
tre