able. Our General, Neill, sat with his staff munching
some of these crackers of doubtful character, when he was handed one
unusually animated. The general broke the cracker, examined it for a
moment, and, handing it back to the servant, said, "Jim, give us one
that hasn't so many worms in it." Many of the men who were on the picket
line that day and the night before, were found, when the relief came
around, dead at their posts, frozen.

During the night of December 1st and 2d, the army withdrew from Mine
Run. The pickets were directed to build fires and keep up a show of
force. Our Seventy-seventh being that night on the picket line, formed
the rear of the rear-guard of the army on its retreat. It was three
o'clock in the morning of December 2d when the picket line was silently
withdrawn. After a rapid march, it crossed the pontoon bridge at
Germania Ford at ten o'clock. Scarcely had the troops crossed the
bridge, when the cavalry of the enemy made its appearance on the south
side of the river. The Seventy-seventh New York, the Third Vermont and a
battery of artillery were directed to remain and guard the ford, while
the remainder of the army continued the march to the old camps. Next
morning the two regiments and the battery started for Brandy Station,
and that night slept in their old quarters.

It was now evident that we were in permanent winter quarters. It is not
our purpose to discuss the merits of this fruitless campaign, but it may
not be out of place to recall some of the facts relating to it. The
orders for marching on the 26th, were issued to all the corps commanders
on the evening previous, indicating the time for leaving camp. The Sixth
corps was to follow the Third, yet when the Sixth corps reached the camp
of that corps, there were no signs of moving. Several hours were thus
lost on the start. General French declared that the order to move did
not reach him on the previous evening, yet he knew that the movement was
expected that day. As the result of this and other delays, two corps did
not reach the position assigned them on the 26th.

When, on the morning of the 27th, General French moved his corps again,
he took the wrong road, and thus brought on a premature engagement,
which caused another delay of twenty-four hours. By this time Lee had
ample opportunity to concentrate his whole army in a strong position on
Mine Run. Had General Meade's orders been promptly obeyed, Lee could
have offered no opposi