able to pay the king his dues,
there appears a public mischief on the face of the record itself. This I
take to be a strong authority in my favour; for if the Court, after many
debates as it is stated, and having given the subject every possible
attention, came to the conclusion, that they were obliged to look at the
record, to see whether the case stated on the record was one which
necessarily connected the act done with some public mischief, we must
necessarily infer from this, that the Court would have been of opinion,
that unless that necessary connexion was established by the statement on
the record, the judgment ought to be different. If I am not correct in
this position, the Court had no occasion to look to the verdict and see
whether it related to the information, and to the information, to see
whether it had a relation to the revenue: the Court would have said, we
must give judgment against the defendants, because it is stated upon
this record, that the object of the defendants was, to impoverish the
farmers of excise. It is by tracing back the thing itself, by shewing
that the farmers of excise are thus made less able to pay their debts to
the government, and therefore that the government was to be injured,
that the act is constituted an offence.

There is another case, in Salkeld, 174, The King _v._ Best. The judgment
of the Court in that case is, that several persons may lawfully meet and
consult to prosecute a guilty person; otherwise, to charge a person who
is innocent, right or wrong, would be indictable. The inference is, that
upon a charge of conspiracy to do an act which in itself is perfectly
innocent, which is not indictable, you must state something upon the
face of the record, shewing a mischief connected with it, to make it
indictable. I submit to your Lordships, there is nothing upon the face
of this record, which does shew any mischief connected with the act
which is made the subject of charge. In conspiracy as in every other
offence, the means may be lawful; but in conspiracy, the end must be
unlawful. It is this which constitutes the only distinction between
cases of conspiracy and of any other crime; that although the means may
be lawful, the end must necessarily be unlawful and mischievous. I say,
it is impossible for your Lordships to collect from any part of this
record, that the end sought to be obtained by these defendants was
unlawful, as against any Act of Parliament or the positive dec