d while he would
state a principle of law with extraordinary precision and
accuracy he had not the gift of making practical application
of the law to existing facts. So a great many of his rulings
were set aside, and it did not seem, when he had held a long
term of Court, that a great deal had been accomplished. But
he was a very learned common-lawyer. His memory was a complete
digest of the decisions down to his time. He comprehended
with marvellous clearness the precise extent to which any
adjudged case went, and would state its doctrine with mathematical
precision.
He hated statutes. He was specially indignant at the abolition
of special pleading. He sent word to me, when I was Chairman
of the Judiciary Committee in the Massachusetts Senate, asking
to have a provision enacted for simplifying the process of
bringing before the full Bench for revision the proceedings
in habeas corpus, or mandamus, or certiorari, or some other
special writ, I forget now what. I called upon him at once,
and pointed out to him that exactly what he wanted was accomplished
by the Practice Act of 1852. This was the statute under which
all our legal proceedings in cases affecting personal property
were had. Metcalf said, with great disgust: "I have said,
sir, that if they did not repeal that thing I would not read
it."
He used to enliven his judgments with remarks showing a good
deal of shrewd wisdom. In one case a man was indicted for
advertising a show without a license. The defendant insisted
that the indictment was insufficient because it set out merely
what the show purported to be, and not what it really was.
On which the Judge remarked: "The indictment sets out all
that is necessary, and, indeed, all that is safe. The show
often falls short of the promise in the show-bill."
There was once a case before him for a field-driver who had
impounded cattle under the old Massachusetts law. The case
took a good many days to try, and innumerable subtle questions
were raised. The Judge began his charge to the jury: "Gentlemen
of the jury, a man who takes up a cow straying in a highway
is a fool."
Another time there was a contest as to the value of some
personal property which had been sold at auction. One side
claimed that the auction-sale was a fair test of the value.
The other claimed that property that was sold at auction was
generally sold at a sacrifice. Metcalf said to the jury:
"According to my observation, t
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