n Henry thus preponderated on the side
of France, she reasonably expected that, if the situation of his affairs
did not permit him to give her assistance, he would at least preserve a
neutrality between the contending parties.[*]

* Bacon, p. 589.

This discourse of the French ambassadors was plausible; and to give
it greater weight, they communicated to Henry, as in confidence, their
master's intention, after he should have settled the differences with
Brittany to lead an army into Italy, and make good his pretensions to
the kingdom of Naples; a project which, they knew, would give no umbrage
to the court of England. But all these artifices were in vain employed
against the penetration of the king. He clearly saw that France had
entertained the view of subduing Brittany; but he also perceived, that
she would meet with great, and, as he thought, insuperable difficulties
in the execution of her project. The native force of that duchy, he
knew, had always been considerable, and had often, without any foreign
assistance, resisted the power of France; the natural temper of
the French nation, he imagined, would make them easily abandon any
enterprise which required perseverance; and as the heir of the crown
was confederated with the duke of Brittany, the ministers would be
still more remiss in prosecuting a scheme which must draw on them his
resentment and displeasure. Should even these internal obstructions be
removed, Maximilian, whose enmity to France was well known, and who now
paid his addresses to the heiress of Brittany, would be able to make a
diversion on the side of Flanders; nor could it be expected that France,
if she prosecuted such ambitious projects, would be allowed to remain in
tranquillity by Ferdinand and Isabella. Above all, he thought the French
court could never expect that England, so deeply interested to preserve
the independency of Brittany, so able by her power and situation to give
effectual and prompt assistance, would permit such an accession of force
to her rival. He imagined, therefore, that the ministers of France,
convinced of the impracticability of their scheme, would at last embrace
pacific views, and would abandon an enterprise so obnoxious to all the
potentates of Europe.

This reasoning of Henry was solid, and might justly engage him in
dilatory and cautious measures: but there entered into his conduct
another motive, which was apt to draw him beyond the just bounds,
because fou