particularly of railheads and junctions had taken place that night in
the whole of the British area. One of the objects of this was to impede
the movements of reserve divisions, and when it is known that detailed
instructions had been issued for the entrainment of the 42nd at Lillers
in case we should be required at some distance, such a policy as this is
easily understood. But the German had reckoned without the London
omnibus driver, who before the war had served another kind of "General."
Arrangements were rapidly completed in twenty-four hours, so that on
the morning of March 23rd the whole division, in battle order, found a
huge fleet of buses ready to convey them to--"Somewhere in France." The
French villagers smiled confidently at us as we journeyed northwards in
the direction of the Portuguese front, but they did not know, poor
souls, that this was the only way the large convoy could "about turn,"
nor did they know, although perhaps they guessed, that the Portuguese
front would collapse the following month and they would be fleeing for
their lives before the blonde beast. We eventually turned our faces
south and rode the whole of that day without stopping over the dusty
roads of France. The Hun had been extraordinarily lucky in weather,
there having been hardly a drop of rain for more than three weeks, so
that the ground was perfectly dry for his operations.

Nightfall found us still travelling, and the day of 24th March had
almost broken before we "debussed" to find ourselves in the devastated
area of the Somme lands, near the village of Ayette. There was no rest
to be had. Uncertainty as to the situation in front and also as to the
future possibilities necessitated an immediate adoption of tactical
positions, and the 127th brigade took up a defensive line, on an outpost
principle, to cover the ground between Ablainzevelle and Courcelles.
Until this had been achieved no man was able to turn his thoughts to
sleep, in fact the sun had been up some hours before this was possible.
The day produced a complexity of events in the handling of which Col.
Bromfield proved himself to be at once human and masterful. In the first
place, a "battle surplus" had to be decided upon. This was a small group
of officers and men, selected as far as possible from each rank and from
each type of specialists, who remained behind the line whilst the
battalion was in action. In the event of the battalion being obliterated
by casualties,