ole Hindoo population, it is far more so than any coherent section of
that population, and is thus the largest body of opinion in the Empire.
Fourthly, it is also the most generally enlightened. It is the only
section of the community which knows its own history and preserves the
tradition of its lost political importance; and if it has held itself
aloof hitherto from competition with other races for the public service,
it has been through pride rather than inability. What Mussulmans there
are who have entered the service of Government have been men of
distinguished capacity. And lastly, it is no isolated body, but remains
in close communication with the mass of its fellow-believers throughout
the world. The Mohammedan population of India is, therefore, an
exceptional as well as a large one.

Our second interest in Mohammedanism lies in Egypt. Here, standing at
the threshold of our commerce with the East, we find another large
community almost wholly Mussulman, for whose well-being we are already
to a certain extent pledged, and in whose political future we perceive
our own to be involved. A hostile Egypt we rightly hold to be an
impossibility for our position; and religious antagonism at Cairo, even
if controlled by military occupation, would be to us a constant menace.
Nor must it be supposed that Egypt, like the Barbary coast, will, into
whose hands soever it falls, change its religious aspect. The population
of the Delta is too industrious, too sober, and content with too little,
to fear competition as agriculturists with either Italians, Greeks, or
Maltese; and the conditions of life under a torrid sun will always
protect Egypt from becoming an European colony. The towns may, indeed,
be overrun by foreigners, but the heart of the country will remain
unchanged, and, like India, will refuse to remodel itself on any foreign
system of civilization. Mohammedanism, therefore, will maintain itself
in Egypt intact, and its good-will will remain our necessity.[19]

A third interest lies in Asiatic Turkey. This we have guaranteed by
treaty against foreign invasion; and though our pledge is nominally to
the Sultan, not to the people of the Empire, and though that pledge is
contingent upon an impossibility, administrative reform, and is
therefore not strictly binding, it is impossible to escape the
admission that we have a moral obligation towards the Mussulmans of
Asia Minor and Syria. How far we may be disposed or able to fu