nce, nay even the ultimate safety of German civilization can
only be secured by a statemanship which shall not repeat the mistake
of Louis XIV and Napoleon. The military defeat of England by Germany
is a wholly possible achievement of arms, _if the conflict be between
these two alone_, but to realize the economic and political fruits
of that victory, Ireland must be detached from the British Empire.
To leave a defeated England still in the full possession of Ireland
would be, not to settle the question of German rights at sea or in
world affairs, but merely to postpone the settlement to a second and
possibly far greater encounter. It would be somewhat as if Rome, after
the first Punic war had left Sicily to Carthage. But Ireland is far
more vital to England than Sicily was to Carthage, and is of far more
account to the future of Europe on the ocean than the possession of
Sicily was to the future of the Mediterranean.
If Germany is to permanently profit from a victory over England, she
must free the narrow seas, not only by the defeat of British fleets
in being, but by ensuring that those seas shall not again be closed
by British fleets yet to be. The German gateway to a free Atlantic
can only be kept open through a free Ireland. For just as the English
Channel under the existing arrangement, whereby Ireland lies hidden
from the rest of Europe, can be closed at will by England, so with
Ireland no longer tied to the girdle of England, that channel cannot
be locked. The key to the freedom of European navigation lies at
Berehaven and not at Dover. With Berehaven won from English hands,
England might close the Channel in truth, but Ireland could shut the
Atlantic. As Richard Dox put it in 1689, quaintly but truly, in his
dedication to King William III, and Queen Mary of his "History of
Ireland from the Earliest Times."
"But no cost can be too great where the prize is of such value, and
whoever considers the situation, ports, plenty and other advantages
of Ireland will confess that it must be retained at what rate soever;
because if it should come into an enemy's hands, England would find
it impossible to _flourish_ and perhaps difficult to _subsist_ without
it. To demonstrate this assertion it is enough to say that Ireland
lies in the Line of Trade and that all the English vessels that
sail to the East, West, and South must, as it were, run the gauntlet
between the harbours of Brest and Baltimore; and I might add that
th
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