r, that the Dutch would make one
fight for their honour, and, once defeated, would accept the inevitable.
All I have heard and whatever I have seen out here contradict these
false ideas. Anger, hatred, and the consciousness of military power
impelled, the Boers to war. They would rather have fought at their own
time--a year or two later--when their preparations were still further
advanced, and when the British were, perhaps, involved in other
quarters. But, after all, the moment was ripe. Nearly everything was
ready, and the whole people sprang to arms with alacrity, firmly
believing that they would drive the British into the sea. To that
opinion they still adhere. I do not myself share it; but it cannot be
denied that it seems less absurd to-day than it did before a shot had
been fired.

To return to Estcourt. Here we are passing through a most dangerous
period. The garrison is utterly insufficient to resist the Boers; the
position wholly indefensible. Indeed, we exist here on sufferance. If
the enemy attack, the troops must fall back on Pietermaritzburg, if for
no other reason because they are the only force available for the
defence of the strong lines now being formed around the chief town.
There are so few cavalry outside Ladysmith that the Boers could raid in
all directions. All this will have been changed long before this letter
reaches you, or I should not send it, but as I write the situation is
saved only by what seems to me the over-confidence of the enemy. They
are concentrating all their efforts on Ladysmith, and evidently hope to
compel its surrender. It may, however, be said with absolute certainty
that the place can hold out for a month at the least. How, then, could
the Boers obtain the necessary time to reduce it? The reinforcements are
on the seas. The railway works regularly with the coast. Even now
sidings are being constructed and troop trains prepared. It is with all
this that they should interfere, and they are perfectly competent to do
so. They could compel us to retreat on Pietermaritzburg, they could
tear up the railway, they could blow up the bridges; and by all these
means they could delay the arrival of a relieving army, and so have a
longer time to worry Ladysmith, and a better chance of making it a
second Saratoga. Since Saturday last that has been our fear. Nearly a
week has passed and nothing has happened. The chance of the Boers is
fleeting; the transports approach the land; scarcely f