the circuit, put up with him at the same hotels,
and often occupied the same room with him. "This simple life," says
Judge Davis, "Mr. Lincoln loved, preferring it to the practice of the
law in the city. In all the elements that constitute the great lawyer,
he had few equals. He seized the strong points of a cause, and presented
them with clearness and great compactness. He read law-books but
little, except when the cause in hand made it necessary; yet he was
unusually self-reliant, depending on his own resources, and rarely
consulting his brother lawyers either on the management of his case or
the legal questions involved. He was the fairest and most accommodating
of practitioners, granting all favors which he could do consistently
with his duty to his client, and rarely availing himself of an unwary
oversight of his adversary. He hated wrong and oppression everywhere,
and many a man, whose fraudulent conduct was undergoing review in a
court of justice, has withered under his terrific indignation and
rebuke."

Mr. Speed says: "As a lawyer, after his first year he was acknowledged
to be among the best in the State. His analytical powers were
marvellous. He always resolved every question into its primary elements,
and gave up every point on his own side that did not seem to be
invulnerable. One would think, to hear him present his case in the
court, he was giving his case away. He would concede point after point
to his adversary. But he always reserved a point upon which he claimed a
decision in his favor, and his concessions magnified the strength of his
claim. He rarely failed in gaining his cases in court."

The special characteristics of Lincoln's practice at the bar are thus
ably summed up: "He did not make a specialty of criminal cases, but was
engaged frequently in them. He could not be called a great lawyer,
measured by the extent of his acquirement of legal knowledge; he was not
an encyclopaedia of cases; but in the clear perception of legal
principles, with natural capacity to apply them, he had great ability.
He was not a case lawyer, but a lawyer who dealt in the deep philosophy
of the law. He always knew the cases which might be quoted as absolute
authority, but beyond that he contented himself in the application and
discussion of general principles. In the trial of a case he moved
cautiously. He never examined or cross-examined a witness to the
detriment of his side. If the witness told the truth, he was