elf-consciousness. The complete system is pure
thought, the Universal _par excellence_.

After the Hegelian there can hardly be said to have been a
philosophical treatment of the categories in Germany which is not more
or less a criticism of that system. It does not seem necessary to
mention the unimportant modifications introduced by Kuno Fischer, J.E.
Erdmann, or others belonging to the school. In the strongly-opposed
philosophy of J.F. Herbart the categories can hardly be said to hold a
prominent place. They are, with him, the most general notions which
are psychologically formed, and he classifies them as follows:--(1)
Thing, either as product of thought or as given in experience; (2)
Property, either qualitative or quantitative; (3) Relation; (4) The
Negated. Along with these he posits as categories of inner
process--(1) Sensation, (2) Cognition, (3) Will, (4) Action. Joh. Fr.
L. George (1811-1873),[10] who in the main follows Schleiermacher,
draws out a table of categories which shows, in some points, traces of
Herbartian influence. His arrangement by enneads, or series of nine,
is fanciful, and wanting in inner principle.

Trendelenburg.

The most imposing of more recent attempts at a reconstruction of the
categories is that of F.A. Trendelenburg. To him the first principle,
or primitive reality, is Motion, which is both real as external
movement, and ideal as inner construction. The necessary conditions of
Motion are Time and Space, which are both subjective and objective.
From this point onwards are developed the mathematical (point, line,
&c.) and real (causality, substance, quantity, quality, &c.)
categories which appear as involved in the notion of motion. Matter
cannot be regarded as a product of motion; it is the condition of
motion, we must think something moved. All these categories, "under
the presupposition of motion as the first energy of thought, are ideal
and subjective relations; as also, under the presupposition of motion
as the first energy of Being, real and objective relations."[11] A
serious difficulty presents itself in the next category, that of End
(_Zweck_), which can easily be thought for inner activity, but can
hardly be reconciled with real motion. Trendelenburg solves the
difficulty only empirically, by pointing to the insufficiency of the
merely mechanical to account for the organic. The consideration of