would have striven might and main to hold out longer.
General Gordon, assisted by the advice and energy of a few English
officers, would have completely regained his influence. It is true,
indeed, that the soldiers were weary of the long siege and continual
fighting, and they had lost all faith in Gordon's repeated promises that
the English were coming. They became heart-broken and in despair; but
Khartum was not for long in the state of distress which prevailed in El
Obeid before that town fell. In Khartum they had only been eating gum
for a few days previous to the fall, while in El Obeid they had existed
on it for months, and had practically nothing else to live upon.

Had the Khartum people but seen one Englishman with their own eyes, they
would have taken fresh courage, and would in all probability have held
out for another month, until the relief for which they had waited so
long was a _fait accompli_. The Mahdi would not have dared to assault
Khartum; and even if he had, it is most probable he would have been
beaten back. Many survivors of Khartum often said to me, "Had we seen
one Englishman, we should have been saved; but our doubt that the
English were really coming, and the feeling that Gordon must be
deceiving us, made us discouraged, and we felt that death would be
preferable to the life of constant war and daily suffering we were
leading during the siege."

The unaccountable delay of the English was the cause of the fall of
Khartum, the death of Gordon, and the fate of the Sudan. The Mahdi only
made up his mind to attack when he heard that they had delayed at Gubat.
He did not begin to cross over his troops till the 24th of January, and
it was not till Sunday night that the crossing was complete. He could
not have attacked earlier than he did. When the first news of his defeat
at Abu Klea reached him he wished to raise the siege and retire to
Kordofan. If the English had appeared at any time before he delivered
the attack he would have raised the siege and retired. Indeed, it was
always his intention to revisit El Obeid before he made his attack.

Even to the present day people in the Sudan cannot understand the reason
for the delay. Some say that the English general was wounded at Abu
Klea, and was lying insensible, and that those who were acting for him
did not dare to undertake any operations until he was sufficiently
recovered to be able to give his own orders.

The Sudanese wondered why Europeans,