. This suggestion
came, perhaps, originally from Bismarck, who was not averse to
embroiling France with Italy. That country longed for Tunis so
conveniently situated near Sicily. England, moreover, was probably not
desirous of seeing the Italians thus strategically ensconced in the
Mediterranean.
In 1881, financial manoeuvres and the plundering expeditions into
Algeria of border tribes called Kroumirs afforded a pretext for
intervention, to the indignation of Italy, which was thus more than ever
inclined to seek alliances against France, even with Germany. Here,
indeed, was the germ of the Triple Alliance. An easy advance to Tunis
forced the Bey to accept a French protectorate by the Treaty of the
Bardo on May 12, 1881. Later in the year the situation became rather
serious, and new and rather costly military operations became necessary,
including the occupation of Sfax, Gabes, and Kairouan.
Thus France came into possession of valuable territories, but at the
cost of Italian indignation. Moreover, Jules Ferry, who was always one
of the most hated of party leaders in his own country, reaped no
advantage to himself. His enemies affected to believe that the whole
Tunisian war was a game of capitalists, or was planned for effect upon
elections to the new Chamber. The boulevards refused to take the
Kroumirs seriously and joked about "Cherchez le Kroumir." Finally, on
November 9, 1881, the personal intervention of Gambetta before the newly
elected Chamber of Deputies saved the Cabinet on a vote of confidence.
Jules Ferry none the less determined to resign, and Gambetta, in spite
of Grevy's aversion, was the inevitable man for the formation of a new
Cabinet.
Gambetta's great opportunity had come too late to be effective. The
undoubted leader of the Republic, he had grown in statesmanship since
his early days, but was still hated by men like Grevy who could not get
over their old prejudices. Then the advanced radicals, or
_intransigeants_, thought him a traitor to his old platforms or
_programmes_.[10] They blamed his Opportunism and said that he wanted
power without responsibility. Gambetta's enemies, whether the duc de
Broglie or Clemenceau, talked of his secret influence (_pouvoir
occulte_), and accused him of aspiring to a dictatorship, in fact if not
in name. Their suspicions were somewhat deepened by Gambetta's ardent
advocacy of the _scrutin de liste_ instead of the existing _scrutin
d'arrondissement_.[11]
It wa
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