nting him
because during his former term of office and throughout his career he
had displayed the qualities which were called for at the present crisis.

Thus Frontenac returned to Quebec in the autumn of 1689, just after the
Iroquois massacred the people of Lachine and just before they descended
upon those of La Chesnaye. The universal mood was one of terror and
despair. If ever Canada needed a Moses this was the hour.

It will be seen from the dates that Denonville's recall was not due to
the Lachine massacre and the other raids of the Iroquois in 1689, for
these only occurred after Frontenac had been appointed. Denonville's
dismissal was justified by the general results of {116} his
administration down to the close of 1688. Before Frontenac left France
a plan of campaign had been agreed upon which it was now his duty to
execute. The outlines of this plan were suggested by Callieres, the
governor of Montreal,[1] who had been sent home by Denonville to
expound the needs of the colony in person and to ask for fresh aid.
The idea was to wage vigorous offensive warfare against the English
from Albany to New York. Success would depend upon swiftness and
audacity, both of which Frontenac possessed in full measure, despite
his years. Two French warships were to be sent direct to New York in
the autumn of 1689, while a raiding party from Canada should set out
for the Hudson as soon as Frontenac could organize it.

In its original form this plan of campaign was never carried out, for
on account of head winds Frontenac reached Quebec too late in the
autumn. However, the central idea remained in full view and suggested
the three war-parties which were sent out during the winter of 1690 to
attack the English colonies.

{117}

Louis XIV had given Denonville important reinforcements, and with war
clouds gathering in Europe he was unwilling or unable to detach more
troops for the defence of Canada. Hence, in warring against the
Iroquois and the English Frontenac had no greater resources than those
at the disposal of Denonville when he attacked the Senecas. In fact,
since 1687 there had been some wastage in the number of the regulars
from disease. The result was that Frontenac could not hope for any
solid success unless he received support from the Canadian militia.

In this crisis the habitants and their seigneurs accepted with courage
the duties laid upon them. In the narrower sense they were fighting
for their h