ely
settle the vital question of the rights of the master in the seizure,
and of the States in the rendition, of fugitive slaves. The Court
decided, fully, that the master had a right to seize his fugitive slave
wherever he could find him, and take him back without process; that the
law of 1793 was constitutional; and that the United States had the
exclusive power of legislation on that matter.

But this did not satisfy Chief Justice Taney. He agreed that the master
had the right of seizure. He declared that this right was the law of
each State, and that no State had power to abrogate or alter it, and
foreshadowed the idea that the Constitution carried Slavery over all
the Territories and States. But he dissented from the Court when they
held the Pennsylvania act to be invalid. And without relying on any
principle, without any discussion of, or the slightest allusion to, any
authorities or the great fundamental questions involved in that issue,
he coolly depicted the inconveniences the slave-catcher might be subject
to in States where there was but one District Judge, and how essentially
he would be aided by the State legislation; and pointed out to his
brethren those "_consequences_" which they did "_not contemplate_" and
to which they "did not suppose the opinion they had given would lead."
And he said that, where the States had such statutes, "it had not
heretofore been supposed necessary, in order to justify those laws, to
refer them to the questionable powers of internal and local police. They
were believed to stand upon surer and safer grounds, to secure the
delivery of the fugitive slave to his lawful owner."

Counsel said, "The long, impatient struggle on that question was nearly
over. The decision of this Court would put it at rest." It was not so.
This decision was made in 1843. But from that time the strife over that
question was more violent than ever. The Slave Power took this decision
as a new concession and guaranty. It certainly affirmed the right of the
master to exercise his absolute power, in the most offensive form, to be
beyond control of all legislation whatever, State or National. The Court
doubtless meant, as the States and the counsel did, by giving to
Congress the exclusive power of legislation on the surrender of
fugitives from labor, to settle this question in such form as to satisfy
the Slave Power.

If the opinion of Mr. Webster be worth anything, they forgot the maxim,
"Judicis est jus