gan of those energies which he
subsequently displayed.

By myriad blows (to use a Lucretian phrase) the image and
superscription of the external world are stamped as states of
consciousness upon the organism, the depth of the impression depending
on the number of the blows. When two or more phenomena occur in the
environment invariably together, they are stamped to the same depth or
to the same relief, and indissolubly connected. And here we come to
the threshold of a great question. Seeing that he could in no way rid
himself of the consciousness of Space and Time, Kant assumed them to
be necessary 'forms of intuition,' the moulds and shapes into which
our intuitions are thrown, belonging to ourselves, and without
objective existence. With unexpected power and success, Mr. Spencer
brings the hereditary experience theory, as he holds it, to bear upon
this question. 'If there exist certain external relations which are
experienced by all organisms at all instants of their waking
lives--relations which are absolutely constant and universal--there
will be established answering internal relations, that are absolutely
constant and universal. Such relations we have in those of Space and
Time. As the substratum of all other relations of the Non-Ego, they
must be responded to by conceptions that are the substrata of all
other relations in the Ego. Being the constant and infinitely
repeated elements of thought, they must become the automatic elements
of thought--the elements of thought which it is impossible to get rid
of--the "forms of intuition."'

Throughout this application and extension of Hartley's and Mill's 'Law
of Inseparable Association,' Mr. Spencer stands upon his own ground,
invoking, instead of the experiences of the individual, the registered
experiences of the race. His overthrow of the restriction of
experience to the individual is, I think, complete. That restriction
ignores the power of organising experience, furnished at the outset to
each individual; it ignores the different degrees of this power
possessed by different races, and by different individuals of the same
race. Were there not in the human brain a potency antecedent to all
experience, a dog or a cat ought to be as capable of education as man.
These predetermined internal relations are independent of the
experiences of the individual. The human brain is the 'organised
register of infinitely numerous experiences received during the
evolu