equity released him from immediate liability. The governor charged him
with perverting the protection of his office, to defeat his creditors,
and amoved him. Mr. Horne, the attorney-general, who framed the acts
repudiated by the judges, was appointed to succeed Judge Montagu, and it
became a question whether his opinion would send the merchants out of
court. The registrar of the supreme court was called before the
executive council, and questioned on the point. He stated that in the
event of a division of opinion on the bench a verdict for the plaintiff
would stand. To the suspension of the chief justice the executive
council were opposed, and Sir Wm. Denison therefore requested the judge
to relieve the government by asking leave of absence. To this he replied
in terms suited to the respectability of his character. "Were I," said
his honor, "to accept your excellency's proposal, I should, it appears
to me, be for ever after degraded, and, _ipso facto_, render myself
unworthy of holding the lowest office or employment which it is in her
Majesty's power to bestow on a subject."[249] At this stage of the
proceedings the warrant constituting the legislative councillors reached
the governor, and the opinion of the chief justice was of less moment to
the executive.

It now remained for the governor to annul either the laws opposed to the
provisions of the parliamentary act, which declared the taxing clauses
illegal, or to subvert those restrictions by declaring them inoperative.
He chose this last course. The Doubts Bill declared that an ordinance
once enrolled, whatever its provisions, or however repugnant to common
law or parliamentary acts, should be held binding on the court; and
although its rejection was proposed by the chief justice and five other
members, it passed the legislative council.

That the "Doubts Bill," so called, was inconsistent with the limitations
of the council, has been virtually determined by a retrospective clause
in the recent constitutional act, which cures the defect of these taxing
clauses, and takes the question of legality from the future judgment of
the court. By the act of 9 Geo. IV., sec. 83, the governor possessed
powers sufficiently ample to pass, without notice or delay, any measure,
and to adhere to its provisions in a pressing emergency; but the
prohibition of taxes, for all but strictly local purposes, was
peremptory and explicit.

An instance of rapid legislation contemplated by th