d--first, that
the case of the colonies was not at all like that of Manchester; the
latter happened not to be represented at that time because the election
laws needed reforming, while the colonies, being three thousand miles
away, could in the nature of the case never be adequately represented in
an English Parliament; and, second, that as a matter of fact a sharp
distinction had always, since the Great Charter, been made between
internal taxation and customs duties.
Had the colonies rested their case upon constitutional argument alone it
would have been relatively weak. While it was then a question, and will
be forever, whether the American settlements were king's colonies,
Parliament's colonies, or neither, but peculiar communities which had
resulted from growth, the English lawyers had a good deal of logic on
their side. Unconstitutional measures had indeed been resorted to--the
writs of assistance, taking Americans beyond sea for trial, internal
taxation; yet the real grievance lay far less in these things than in
the fact that the English constitution itself was working in a manner
contrary to colonial interests. Social considerations, too, accounted
for more bitterness than has usually been thought. Our fathers hated the
presence here of a privileged class.
George III.'s policy was therefore wiser legally than politically. This
was, in fact, his ministry's capital mistake--like Lord Salisbury's in
respect to Ireland in 1888--that it had too great regard for the mere
legal aspect of the question, ignoring the practical. The colonists were
too numerous, powerful, and far away, longer to be governed from home,
at least by the old plan. To attempt perpetuation of the old regime
might be lawful, but was certainly impracticable and stupid. Hence
Americans like Jefferson showed themselves consummate politicians in
going beyond Pitt's contention from the constitution and from precedent,
and appealing to the "natural rights" of the colonists. "Our rights,"
said Otis, in substance, "do not rest on a charter, but are inherent in
us as men." "The people" said John Adams in 1765, "have rights
antecedent to all earthly government."
[1767]
The Stamp Act was repealed in February. Its principle, however, was
immediately re-asserted by the "Declaratory Act," in which Parliament
claimed power over the colonies "in all cases whatsoever." The repeal
caused great rejoicing in America; but neither king nor Parliament had
chang
|