rder to drive the French
scoundrels out of the Kingdom, which, with God's blessing will very
soon be effected, when a part of this squadron shall be immediately
sent to Minorca; but unless the French are at least drove from Capua,
I think it right not to obey your Lordship's order for sending down
any part of the squadron under my orders. I am perfectly aware of the
consequences of disobeying the orders of my commander-in-chief." It
cannot be said that the offensiveness of the act of disobedience is
tempered by any very conciliatory tone in the words used. The reason
for disobedience makes matters rather worse. "As I believe the safety
of the Kingdom of Naples depends at the present moment on my detaining
the squadron, I have no scruple in deciding that it is better to save
the Kingdom of Naples and risk Minorca, than to risk the Kingdom of
Naples to save Minorca." When he thus wrote, Nelson knew that Bruix
had joined the Spanish fleet in Cartagena, making a combined force of
forty ships, to which Keith, after stripping Minorca, could oppose
thirty-one.
None of Nelson's letters reached Keith until long after he had left
the Mediterranean, which probably prevented the matter being brought
to a direct issue between the two, such as would have compelled the
Admiralty to take some decisive action. On the 10th of July the
commander-in-chief sailed from Port Mahon for Cartagena, following on
the tracks of the allied fleets, which he pursued into the Atlantic
and to Brest, where they succeeded in entering on the 13th of August,
just twenty-four hours before the British came up. The narrow margin
of this escape inevitably suggests the thought, of how much
consequence might have been the co-operation of the dozen ships
Nelson could have brought. It is true, certainly, as matters turned
out, that even had he obeyed, they could not have accompanied Keith,
nor in the event did any harm come to Minorca; but there was no
knowledge in Nelson's possession that made an encounter between the
two great fleets impossible, nor was it till three days after his
former refusal to obey, that he knew certainly that Keith had given up
all expectation of a junction with himself. Then, on the 22d of July,
he received two letters dated the 14th, and couched in tones so
peremptory as to suggest a suspicion that no milder words would
enforce obedience--that his Commander-in-chief feared that nothing
short of cast-iron orders would drag him away from
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