and a term
of years substituted for perpetuity.
Chief among those who, in opposition to this decision, advised the
lords that literary property was not less inviolable than any species
of property known to the law of England, was Sir William Blackstone.
The most important influence in support of the decision was exercised
by the arguments of Justice Yates and Lord Camden. "This judgment,"
says Drone, "has continued to represent the law; but its soundness has
been questioned by very high authorities." In 1851 Lord Campbell
expressed his agreement with the views of Lord Mansfield. In 1854,
Justice Coleridge said: "If there was one subject more than another
upon which the great and varied learning of Lord Mansfield, his
special familiarity with it, and the philosophical turn of his
intellect, could give his judgment peculiar weight, it was this. I
require no higher authority for a position which seems to me in itself
reasonable and just."
In 1841 an important debate took place in Parliament upon this same
issue. The right at common law of ownership in perpetuity was asserted
by Sergeant Talfourd and Lord Mahon, and the opinion that copyright
was the creation of statute law and should be limited to a term of
years was defended by Macaulay.
The conclusions of the latter were accepted by the House, and the act
of 1842, which is still in force, was the result. By this act the term
of copyright was fixed at forty-two years, or if at the end of that
time the author be still living, for the duration of his life.
I have referred to these discussions as to the nature of the
authority through which the author's ownership exists or is created,
as the question will be found to have an important bearing upon
international copyright. In connection with this debate of 1842 was
framed the famous petition of Thomas Hood, which, if it were not
presented to Parliament, certainly deserved to be. It makes a fair
presentment of the author's case, and is worth quoting:
"That your petitioner is the proprietor of certain copyrights
which the law treats as copyhold, but which in justice and
equity, should be his freeholds. He cannot conceive how 'Hood's
Own,' without a change in the title-deeds as well as the title,
can become 'Everybody's Own' hereafter.
"That your petitioner may burn or publish his manuscripts at his
own option, and enjoys a right in and control over his own
productions which
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