time he was busy burying his
dead, began to withdraw, by the Fairfield and Chambersburg roads, on
the night of this latter day. The movement was deliberate, and without
marks of haste, the rear-guard not leaving the vicinity of Gettysburg
until the morning of the 5th. Those who looked upon the Southern army
at this time can testify that the spirit of the troops was unsubdued.
They had been severely checked, but there every thing had ended.
Weary, covered with dust, with wounds whose bandages were soaked in
blood, the men tramped on in excellent spirits, and were plainly ready
to take position at the first word from Lee, and meet any attack of
the enemy with a nerve as perfect as when they had advanced.

For the reasons stated by himself, General Meade did not attack. He
had secured substantial victory by awaiting Lee's assault on strong
ground, and was unwilling now to risk a disaster, such as he had
inflicted, by attacking Lee in position. The enthusiasm of the
authorities at Washington was not shared by the cool commander of
the Federal army. He perfectly well understood the real strength and
condition of his adversary, and seems never to have had any intention
of striking at him unless a change of circumstances gave him some
better prospect of success than he could see at that time.

The retrograde movement of the Southern army now began, Lee's trains
retiring by way of Chambersburg, and his infantry over the Fairfield
road, in the direction of Hagerstown. General Meade at first moved
directly on the track of his enemy. The design of a "stern chase" was,
however, speedily abandoned by the Federal commander, who changed the
direction of his march and moved southward toward Frederick. When near
that point he crossed the South Mountain, went toward Sharpsburg, and
on the 12th of July found himself in front of the Southern army near
Williamsport, where Lee had formed line of battle to receive his
adversary's attack.

The deliberate character of General Meade's movements sufficiently
indicates the disinclination he felt to place himself directly in his
opponent's front, and thus receive the full weight of his attack.
There is reason, indeed, to believe that nothing could better have
suited the views of General Meade than for Lee to have passed the
Potomac before his arrival--which event would have signified the
entire abandonment of the campaign of invasion, leaving victory on the
side of the Federal army. But the ele