discussion. The force at Lee's command was a little over one-third
of General Grant's; and, if it be true that the latter commander
continued to receive reenforcements between the 1st and 4th days of
May, when he crossed the Rapidan, Lee's force was probably less than
one-third of his adversary's.

Longstreet, it will be seen, had been brought back from the West, but
the Confederates labored under an even more serious disadvantage than
want of sufficient force. Lee's army, small as it was, was wretchedly
supplied. Half the men were in rags, and, worse still, were but
one-fourth fed. Against this suicidal policy, in reference to an army
upon which depended the fate of the South, General Lee had protested
in vain. Whether from fault in the authorities or from circumstances
over which they could exercise no control, adequate supplies of food
did not reach the army; and, when it marched to meet the enemy, in the
first days of May, the men were gaunt, half-fed, and in no condition
to enter upon so arduous a campaign. There was naught to be done,
however, but to fight on to the end. Upon the Army of Northern
Virginia, depleted by casualties, and unprovided with the commonest
necessaries, depended the fate of the struggle. Generals Grant and Lee
fully realized that fact; and the Federal commander had the acumen to
perceive that the conflict was to be long and determined. He indulged
no anticipations of an early or easy success. His plan, as stated in
his official report, was "to _hammer continuously_ against the armed
force of the enemy and his resources, until _by mere attrition_, if
by nothing else, there should be nothing left of him but an equal
submission with the loyal section of our common country to the
Constitution and the laws." The frightful cost in blood of this policy
of hammering continuously and thus wearing away his adversary's
strength by mere attrition, did or did not occur to General Grant. In
either case he is not justly to be blamed.

It was the only policy which promised to result in Federal success.
Pitched battles had been tried for nearly three years, and in victory
or in defeat the Southern army seemed equally unshaken and dangerous.
This fact was now felt and acknowledged even by its enemies. "Lee's
army," said a Northern writer, referring to it at this time, "is an
army of veterans: it is an instrument sharpened to a perfect edge. You
turn its flanks--well, its flanks are made to be turned. This ef