e had determined to pass
the Rappahannock above Fredericksburg, turn Lee's flank, and thus
force him to deliver battle under this disadvantage, or retire upon
Richmond. The safe passage of the stream was the first great object,
and General Hooker's dispositions to effect this were highly
judicious. A force of about twenty thousand men was to pass the
Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, and thus produce upon Lee the
impression that the Federal army was about to renew the attempt in
which they had failed under General Burnside. While General Lee's
attention was engaged by the force thus threatening his right, the
main body of the Northern army was to cross the Rappahannock and
Rapidan above Chancellorsville, and, sweeping down rapidly upon
the Confederate left flank, take up a strong position between
Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg. The column which had crossed at
the latter point to engage the attention of the Confederate commander,
was then to recross to the northern bank, move rapidly to the upper
fords, which the advance of the main body would by that time have
uncovered; and, a second time crossing to the southern bank, unite
with the rest. Thus the whole Federal army would be concentrated
on the southern bank of the Rappahannock, and General Lee would be
compelled to leave his camps on the hills of the Massaponnax, and
fight upon ground dictated by his adversary. If he did not thus accept
battle, but one other course was left. He must fall back in the
direction of Richmond, to prevent his adversary from attacking his
rear, and capturing or destroying his army.
In order to insure the success of this promising plan of attack, a
strong column of well-mounted cavalry was to cross in advance of the
army and strike for the railroads in Lee's rear, connecting him with
Richmond and the Southwest. Thus flanked or cut off, and with all his
communications destroyed, it seemed probable that General Lee would
suffer decisive defeat, and that the Federal army would march in
triumph to the capture of the Confederate capital.
This plan was certainly excellent, and seemed sure to succeed. It was,
however, open to some criticism, as the event showed. General Hooker
was detaching, in the beginning of the movement, his whole cavalry
force for a distant operation, and dividing his army by the _ruse_
at Fredericksburg, in face of an adversary not likely to permit that
great error to escape him. While advancing thus, apparently to the
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