him. The Regent made him work with the Duc de Noailles,
with Rouille, with Amelot--this last for commercial matters. The first
two were afraid of an intruder, favoured by the Regent, in their
administration; so that Law was a long time tossed about, but was always
backed by the Duc d'Orleans. At last, the bank project pleased that
Prince so much that he wished to carry it out. He spoke in private to
the heads of finance, in whom he found great opposition. He had often
spoken to me of it, and I had contented myself with listening to him upon
a matter I never liked, and which, consequently, I never well understood;
and the carrying out of which appeared to me distant. When he had
entirely formed his resolution, he summoned a financial and commercial
assembly, in which Law explained the whole plan of the bank he wished to
establish (this was on the 24th of October, 1715). He was listened to as
long as he liked to talk. Some, who saw that the Regent was almost
decided, acquiesced; but the majority opposed.

Law was not disheartened. The majority were spoken to privately in very
good French. Nearly the same assembly was called, in which, the Regent
being present, Law again explained his project. This time few opposed
and feebly. The Duc de Noailles was obliged to give in. The bank being
approved of in this manner, it had next to be proposed to the regency
council.

M. le Duc d'Orleans took the trouble to speak in private to each member
of the council, and gently to make them understand that he wished the
bank to meet with no opposition. He spoke his mind to me thoroughly:
therefore a reply was necessary. I said to him that I did not hide my
ignorance or my disgust for all finance matters; that, nevertheless, what
he had just explained to me appeared good in itself, that without any new
tax, without expense, and without wronging or embarrassing anybody, money
should double itself at once by means of the notes of this bank, and
become transferable with the greatest facility. But along with this
advantage I found two inconveniences, the first, how to govern the bank
with sufficient foresight and wisdom, so as not to issue more notes than
could be paid whenever presented: the second, that what is excellent in a
republic, or in a monarchy where the finance is entirely popular, as in
England, is of pernicious use in an absolute monarchy, such as France,
where the necessities of a war badly undertaken and ill sustai