ith anxious diligence to divide the
substance and to multiply the titles of power. The vast countries
which the Roman conquerors had united under the same simple form of
administration, were imperceptibly crumbled into minute fragments; till
at length the whole empire was distributed into one hundred and
sixteen provinces, each of which supported an expensive and splendid
establishment. Of these, three were governed by proconsuls, thirty-seven
by consulars, five by correctors, and seventy-one by presidents.
The appellations of these magistrates were different; they ranked in
successive order, the ensigns of and their situation, from accidental
circumstances, might be more or less agreeable or advantageous. But they
were all (excepting only the pro-consuls) alike included in the class of
honorable persons; and they were alike intrusted, during the pleasure of
the prince, and under the authority of the praefects or their deputies,
with the administration of justice and the finances in their respective
districts. The ponderous volumes of the Codes and Pandects [113]
would furnish ample materials for a minute inquiry into the system of
provincial government, as in the space of six centuries it was approved
by the wisdom of the Roman statesmen and lawyers.

It may be sufficient for the historian to select two singular and
salutary provisions, intended to restrain the abuse of authority.

1. For the preservation of peace and order, the governors of the
provinces were armed with the sword of justice. They inflicted corporal
punishments, and they exercised, in capital offences, the power of
life and death. But they were not authorized to indulge the condemned
criminal with the choice of his own execution, or to pronounce a
sentence of the mildest and most honorable kind of exile. These
prerogatives were reserved to the praefects, who alone could impose the
heavy fine of fifty pounds of gold: their vicegerents were confined to
the trifling weight of a few ounces. [114] This distinction, which seems
to grant the larger, while it denies the smaller degree of authority,
was founded on a very rational motive. The smaller degree was infinitely
more liable to abuse. The passions of a provincial magistrate might
frequently provoke him into acts of oppression, which affected only
the freedom or the fortunes of the subject; though, from a principle of
prudence, perhaps of humanity, he might still be terrified by the
guilt of innocent bl