arch 1965 raised
questions as to the future direction of Romanian foreign policy.

Under Gheorghiu-Dej's successor, Nicolae Ceausescu, Romania's foreign
policy continued to diverge from that of the Soviet Union and the other
members of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. Increasingly assertive of
national interests, the Ceausescu regime antagonized the Soviet Union by
its establishment of diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of
Germany (West Germany) in 1967 and by its refusal to follow the Soviet
lead in breaking relations with Israel in the wake of the 1967
Arab-Israeli War.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet-led forces of the Warsaw Pact
in August 1968 posed a particular threat to Romania. Observers of
Eastern European political affairs saw the invasion as a severe blow to
the basic assumptions of Romanian foreign policy, which included the
belief that the Soviet Union would not intervene militarily against
another member of the Warsaw Pact as long as the system of communist
party rule was firmly maintained and membership in the pact was
continued.

From the outset of the Czechoslovak crisis the Ceausescu regime asserted
that the only basis for relations between states was respect for
national independence and sovereignty and a policy of noninterference in
another state's internal affairs. The actual invasion, however, marked a
reversal for Romanian foreign policy and, although the initial response
was one of condemnation and defiance, Romania was put on the defensive.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia marked something of a turning point in
Romania's relations with COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet
enunciation of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine--the concept that the
protection of socialism in any communist state is the legitimate concern
of all communist states--was intended as a clear warning to the
Ceausescu regime.

Pressures mounted on Romania to cooperate more fully in the Warsaw Pact
and to agree to a supranational planning body within the framework of
COMECON. Economic conditions as well as the political and military
pressures pushed the Ceausescu regime toward closer cooperation with
COMECON, although the Romanians continued to resist the Soviet efforts
toward economic integration.

As a result of these pressures, the 1968-70 period was one of relative
passivity for the Romanians in foreign affairs, although the period was
marked by several important events, including the visit of Preside