e fifth century we often
hear of active sacrilegious outrages. An example is the historic trial of
Alcibiades for profanation of the Mysteries. But this was not an isolated
occurrence; there were more of the same kind at the time. Of the
dithyrambic poet Cinesias it is said that he profaned holy things in an
obscene manner. But the greatest stress of all must be laid on the
well-known mutilation of the Hermae at Athens in 415, just before the
expedition to Sicily. All the tales about the outrages of the Mysteries
_may_ have been fictitious, but it is a fact that the Hermae were
mutilated. The motive was probably political: the members of a secret
society intended to pledge themselves to each other by all committing a
capital crime. But that they chose just this form of crime shows quite
clearly that respect for the State religion had greatly declined in these
circles.
What has so far been adduced as proof that the belief in the gods had
begun to waver in Athens at the end of the fifth century is, in my
opinion, conclusive in itself to anybody who is familiar with the more
ancient Greek modes of thought and expression on this point, and can not
only hear what is said, but also understand how it is said and what is
passed over in silence. Of course it can always be objected that the
proofs are partly the assertions of a comic poet who certainly was not
particular about accusations of impiety, partly deductions _ex silentio_,
partly actions the motives for which are uncertain. Fortunately, however,
we have--from a slightly later period, it is true--a positive utterance
which confirms our conclusion and which comes from a man who was not in
the habit of talking idly and who had the best opportunities of knowing
the circumstances.
In the tenth book of his _Laws_, written shortly before his death, _i.e._
about the middle of the fourth century, Plato gives a detailed account of
the question of irreligion seen from the point of view of penal
legislation. He distinguishes here between three forms, namely, denial of
the existence of the gods, denial of the divine providence (whereas the
existence of the gods is admitted), and finally the assumption that the
gods exist and exercise providence, but that they allow themselves to be
influenced by sacrifices and prayers. Of these three categories the last
is evidently directed against ancient popular belief itself; it does not
therefore interest us in this connexion. The second vie
|