early at equal distances from Raquet's and Jourdan's canal, where
the wood inclines to the river, leaving a space of only about nine
hundred yards between the swampy wood and the river. Works occupying
this space could not well be turned, without a siege and assault in
heavy force by the enemy. I made a rough draft of the intended line,
and immediately the overseer set his negroes to execute the work.
Returning to the left bank, I made my report to the
Commander-in-chief, who approved the disposition made. One thousand
men could have guarded a breastwork line here, and half that number
would have been sufficient had pieces of cannon been mounted in the
intended outworks. That line, defended by the eight hundred troops
and the artillery of General Morgan's command, on the 8th, could have
defied three or four times the number of British who crossed over to
the right bank that day. But these dispositions had been changed by
General Morgan, and the negroes ordered to work on the Raquet line.
Major Latour had selected for General Jackson his line of defense on the
left bank of the river, and had directed the construction of the
breastwork and redoubts to the entire satisfaction of the General. He
objected to the Raquet line favored by General Morgan, as wholly
unsuited for defense. The space here from the river to the wood swamp
was two thousand yards, or considerably over one mile, a much longer
line than Jackson's on the other side. To be effective against an
attacking force, the entrenchment and outworks must be extended to cover
the entire space. It would require then more than double the number of
troops and of pieces of artillery for defense than the situation
selected by Latour.
In determining on this change of the line of defense, contrary to the
judgment and warning of the chief of the engineer corps, General Morgan
seems to have been influenced by one consideration paramount to all
others. He was in daily council with Commodore Patterson, and was
assured of the powerful aid of his battery on the right bank, which had
done such execution in the ranks of the British across the river. Should
the enemy attack General Morgan's position at Raquet's line, the
Commodore could turn his twelve pieces of cannon in their embrasures,
sweep the field, and drive back any reasonable force in range. With
this support of his artillery, the few hundred militia of Morgan's
command could mor
|