allen back in
good order, and made a stubborn fight on the line of battle. But there
was only one third the Kentucky force expected; and when Major Arnaud's
command retreated, there was but this contingent of one hundred and
seventy Kentucky militia left to resist the advance of one thousand
British veterans, and to meet their main assault on the center and right
of the long line of battle. It made its march from New Orleans at
midnight, and was reported to General Morgan before daybreak. These
facts give a more intelligible view of the plan of battle arranged by
this officer. It was undoubtedly marred and broken up by the unforeseen
incidents mentioned, unfortunately for General Morgan and for the
American cause. Commodore Patterson, in his report to the Secretary of
the Navy, five days after the battle, makes the force of Kentucky
militia that gave way before the British four hundred men, more than
double the real number; thus showing the error prevalent.
When the facts came out that General Adair had secured the four hundred
stand of city arms for his own immediate command with which Jackson had
designed to arm the reinforcement for General Morgan, the incident was
naturally very irritating to the Commander-in-chief. It was imputed as a
cause, in part, of the defeat and disaster on the right bank. Jackson
seems to have complained to Adair that the latter ought to have known of
his order to call out the detachment of five hundred Kentuckians in
time, and of his intention to arm them in the city. Adair replied that
the order came to General Thomas, in chief command of the Kentuckians,
lying ill in camp, while he was busily engaged in New Orleans and at the
front, preparing his own command for battle next day; that he did not
know of the intention of Jackson to use the city arms until too late to
repair the mistake. It made up a chapter of accidents and errors,
happening with best intentions. As for the little body of Kentucky
militia, who were made sensationally notorious, where there was honor
and fame for no one, poorly armed and wearied with fasting and a heavy
all-night march, they did as well as troops could do. It is doubtful if
any one hundred and seventy troops in Jackson's army would have done
better. Unsupported, and attacked and flanked by four times their own
number, no troops could have held their ground longer.
In the possession of Judge William H. Seymour, of New Orleans, is an
original letter of Majo
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