general was to co-operate--a word of very elastic meaning, and
responsible for much velvet-covered mutiny during the present
campaign--with the columns in his neighbourhood which, over and above
the skeleton of the New Cavalry Brigade, had concentrated that day at
Britstown. A message in cipher gave an inkling of the plan which had
risen phoenix-like out of the ashes of the original dispositions. De
Wet, instead of being enticed south, was to be driven north into the
loop of the Orange River between Prieska and Hopetown, where Charles
Knox's column and a column of Kimberley swashbucklers would be ready
for him. The Britstown columns, and the brigadier of the New Cavalry
Brigade co-operating, would push north--wheel into line with the
panting Plumer, now north of Strydenburg, and then "Forward away!"
Now, just as the original scheme had, when on paper, presented a very
reasonable and common-sense stratagem, so with the new incubation. But
there were three main factors over which the gilt cap at Pretoria had
no control, and which dished this, as they have dished ninety-nine out
of every hundred of schemes which were undertaken during the guerilla
war. The first of these three lay in the fact that the strategy was a
conformation to the enemy's movements. This naturally gave him time to
think and to develop his counter-move, with all advantages in the
balance. No. 2 is to be found in the timidity of certain of the column
commanders. Men who proverbially take every opportunity of sacrificing
the main issue to pursue some subsidiary policy. Men whom De Wet
loves, and whom he plays with, decoys, and bluffs until he achieves
his object. Men whose heart will not take them, like Plumer,
"slap-bang" along the course which must lead to heavy conclusions, if
the enemy will fight; but who prefer to fritter away the _morale_ and
efficiency of their columns in pursuing a phantom enemy. Choosing a
country in which an enemy as sagacious as the Boer would never
operate, these men are careful not to leave the security it affords,
though their telegrams to headquarters build up the statistics which
have misled our calculations throughout the war. The third reason is
just as deplorable. It is the passive resistance evinced between
column commanders, who are called upon to co-operate. These leaders,
instead of sinking all differences in one common objective, work
rather as if they were employed in a business competition. And why is
this? Ask