he was
obdurate. Withdrawal would create a revolution at home, he said.
Finally, by persuading his secretaries that he had to bend to the
blast, and always holding that it would be only a temporary occupation
and that a way out would be found, the Cabinet yielded.

He sent for President Schurman, of Cornell University, who had opposed
annexation and made him chairman of the committee to visit the
Filipinos; and later for Judge Taft, who had been prominent against
such a violation of American policy, to go as Governor. When the Judge
stated that it seemed strange to send for one, who had publicly
denounced annexation, the President said that was the very reason why
he wished him for the place. This was all very well, but to refrain
from annexing and to relinquish territory once purchased are different
propositions. This was soon seen.

Mr. Bryan had it in his power at one time to defeat in the Senate this
feature of the Treaty of Peace with Spain. I went to Washington to try
to effect this, and remained there until the vote was taken. I was
told that when Mr. Bryan was in Washington he had advised his friends
that it would be good party policy to allow the treaty to pass. This
would discredit the Republican Party before the people; that "paying
twenty millions for a revolution" would defeat any party. There were
seven staunch Bryan men anxious to vote against Philippine annexation.

Mr. Bryan had called to see me in New York upon the subject, because
my opposition to the purchase had been so pronounced, and I now wired
him at Omaha explaining the situation and begging him to wire me that
his friends could use their own judgment. His reply was what I have
stated--better have the Republicans pass it and let it then go before
the people. I thought it unworthy of him to subordinate such an issue,
fraught with deplorable consequences, to mere party politics. It
required the casting vote of the Speaker to carry the measure. One
word from Mr. Bryan would have saved the country from the disaster. I
could not be cordial to him for years afterwards. He had seemed to me
a man who was willing to sacrifice his country and his personal
convictions for party advantage.

When I called upon President McKinley immediately after the vote, I
condoled with him upon being dependent for support upon his leading
opponent. I explained just how his victory had been won and suggested
that he should send his grateful acknowledgments to Mr. Bry