ity to be reformed and saved; for without freedom there
can be no reformation or salvation. With any rational intuition any
one can see that it is a part of man's freedom to be able to think
wrongly or rightly, sincerely or insincerely, justly or unjustly;
also that he is free to speak and act rightly, honestly, and justly;
but not to speak and act wrongly, insincerely, and unjustly, because
of the spiritual, moral, and civil laws whereby his external is held
in restraint. Evidently, then, it is man's spirit, which thinks and
wills, that is in freedom, and not his external which speaks and
acts, except in agreement with the above mentioned laws.

598. Man cannot be reformed unless he has freedom, for the reason
that he is born into evils of every kind; and these must be removed
in order that he may be saved; and they cannot be removed unless he
sees them in himself and acknowledges them, and afterwards ceases to
will them, and finally holds them in aversion. Not until then are
they removed. And this cannot be done unless man is in good as well
as in evil, since it is from good that he is able to see evils, while
from evil he cannot see good. The spiritual goods that man is capable
of thinking he learns from childhood by reading the Word and from
preaching; and he learns moral and civil good from his life in the
world. This is the first reason why man ought to be in freedom. [2]
Another reason is that nothing is appropriated to man except what is
done from an affection of his love. Other things may gain entrance,
but no farther than the thought, not reaching the will; and whatever
does not gain entrance into the will of man does not become his, for
thought derives what pertains to it from memory, while the will
derives what pertains to it from the life itself. Only what is from
the will, or what is the same, from the affection of love, can be
called free, for whatever a man wills or loves that he does freely;
consequently man's freedom and the affection of his love or of his
will are a one. It is for this reason that man has freedom, in order
that he may be affected by truth and good or may love them, and that
they may thus become as if they were his own [3] In a word, whatever
does not enter into man's freedom has no permanence, because it does
not belong to his love or will, and what does not belong to man's
love or will does not belong to his spirit; for the very being [esse]
of the spirit of man is love or will. It