Roman soldier had to keep his footing, and
use his arms moreover for fighting, with some half-hundredweight
of accoutrements about him. To form rank was, of course, out of
the question. The men forced their way onward, singly and in little
groups, often having to stand back to back in rallying-squares, as
soon as they came within hand-stroke of the enemy.[82] And this was
before they reached dry land. For the British cavalry and chariots
dashed into the water to meet them, making full use of the advantage
which horsemen have under such circumstances, able to ply the full
swing of their arms unembarrassed by the waves, not lifted off their
feet or rolled over by the swell, and delivering their blows from
above on foes already in difficulties. And on their side, they copied
the flanking movement of the Romans, and wheeled round a detachment
to fire upon the _latus apertum_ of such invaders as succeeded in
reaching shallower water.

C. 14.--Thus the fight, in Caesar's words, was an exceedingly sharp
one. It was not decided till he sent in the boats of his galleys, and
any other light craft he had, to mingle with the combatants. These
could doubtless get right alongside the British chariots; and now the
advantage of position came to be the other way. A troop of irregular
horsemen up to their girths in water is no match for a boat's crew of
disciplined infantry. Moreover the tide was flowing,[83] and driving
the Britons back moment by moment. For a while they yet resisted
bravely, but discipline had the last word. Yard by yard the Romans won
their way, till at length they set foot ashore, formed up on the beach
in that open order[84] which made the unique strength of the Legions,
and delivered their irresistible charge. The Britons did not wait for
the shock. Their infantry was, probably, already in retreat, covered
by the cavalry and chariots, who now in their turn gave rein to their
ponies and retired at a gallop.

C. 15.--Caesar saw them go, and bitterly felt that his luck had failed
him. Had he but cavalry, this retreat might have been turned into
a rout. But his eighteen transports had failed to arrive, and his
drenched and exhausted infantry were in no case for effective pursuit
of a foe so superior in mobility. Moreover the sun must have been now
fast sinking, and all speed had to be made to get the camp fortified
before nightfall. But the Roman soldier was an adept at entrenching
himself. A rampart was hastily thr