t the vainest and most volatile of nations, there were
abundant elements of discontent afloat among all those classes who had
originally approved of, or profited by, the revolution of 1792.

Of these the most powerful and dangerous remains to be noticed; and,
indeed, had the Bourbons adopted judicious measures concerning _the
army_, it is very probable that the alarms of the other classes now
alluded to might have subsided. The Allies, in the moment of universal
delight and conciliation, restored at once, and without stipulation, the
whole of the prisoners who had fallen into their hands during the war.
At least 150,000 veteran soldiers of Buonaparte were thus poured into
France ere Louis was well-seated on the throne; men, the greater part of
whom had witnessed nothing of the last disastrous campaigns; who had
sustained themselves in their exile by brooding over the earlier
victories in which themselves had had a part; and who now, returning
fresh and vigorous to their native soil, had but one answer to every
tale of misfortune which met them: "These things could never have
happened had we been here."

The conquerors, in their anxiety to procure for Louis XVIII. a warm
reception among the French, had been led into other mistakes, which all
tended to the same issue. They had (with some exceptions on the part of
Prussia) left the pictures and statues, the trophies of Napoleon's
battles, untouched in the Louvre--they had not even disturbed the
monuments erected in commemoration of their own disgraces. These
instances of forbearance were now attributed by the fierce and haughty
soldiery of Buonaparte, to the lingering influence of that terror which
their own arms under his guidance had been accustomed to inspire.
Lastly, the concessions to Napoleon himself of his imperial title, and
an independent sovereignty almost within view of France, were
interpreted in the same fashion by these habitual worshippers of his
renown. The restored King, on his part, was anxious about nothing so
much as to conciliate the affections of the army. With this view he kept
together bands which, long accustomed to all the licence of warfare,
would hardly have submitted to peace even under Napoleon himself. Even
the Imperial Guard, those chosen and devoted children of the Emperor,
were maintained entire on their old establishment; the Legion of Honour
was continued as before; the war ministry was given to Soult, the
ablest, in common estimation,