ull strength Bagdad was out of the danger zone.
General Allenby's force was so disposed that any suggestion of
the Yilderim operation being put into execution was ruled out of
consideration.

Several documents captured at Yilderim headquarters at Nazareth in
September 1918, when General Allenby made his big drive through Syria,
show very clearly how our Palestine operations changed the whole of
the German plans, and reading between the lines one can realise how
the impatience of the Germans was increasing Turkish stubbornness
and creating friction and ill-feeling. The German military character
brooks no opposition; the Turks like to postpone till to-morrow what
should be done to-day. The latter were cocksure after their two
successes at Gaza they could hold us up; the Germans believed that
with an offensive against us they would hold us in check till the wet
season arrived.[1]

[Footnote 1: See Appendices I., II., and III.]

Down to the south the Turks had to bring their divisions. Their line
of communications was very bad. There was a railway from Aleppo
through Rayak to Damascus, and onwards through Deraa (on the Hedjaz
line) to Afule, Messudieh, Tul Keram, Ramleh, Junction Station to Beit
Hanun, on the Gaza sector, and through Et Tineh to Beersheba. Rolling
stock was short and fuel was scarce, and the enemy had short rations.
When we advanced through Syria in the autumn of 1918 our transport was
nobly served by motor-lorry columns which performed marvels in getting
up supplies over the worst of roads. But as we went ahead we, having
command of the sea, landed stores all the way up the coast, and unless
the Navy had lent its helping hand we should never have got to Aleppo
before the Turk cried 'Enough.' Every ounce of the Turks' supplies had
to be hauled over land. They managed to put ten infantry divisions and
one cavalry division against us in the first three weeks, but they
were not comparable in strength to our seven infantry divisions and
three cavalry divisions. In rifle strength we outnumbered them by two
to one, but if the enemy had been well led and properly rationed he,
being on the defensive and having strong prepared positions, should
have had the power to resist us more strongly. The Turkish divisions
we attacked were: 3rd, 7th, 16th, 19th, 20th, 24th, 26th, 27th, 53rd,
and 54th, and the 3rd Cavalry Division. The latter avoided battle, but
all the infantry divisions had heavy casualties. That the moral