ailroad entered a new period in its history. The strong, progressive
interests which now took control concentrated their energies on
developing traffic, increasing earnings, and rounding out the general
system. They adopted careful measures for unifying the system by adding
other lines and connections of value; they paid much attention to the
improvement and development of terminals; and they spent many millions
in acquiring and expanding the terminal properties of the company at
Chicago, St. Louis, Philadelphia, and Baltimore.

The financial history of the Baltimore and Ohio since the close of the
nineteenth century is interesting chiefly in connection with changes
in the control of the property. After the reorganization a group of
prominent financiers, including Marshall Field, Philip D. Armour, Norman
B. Ream, and James J. Hill jointly purchased a large interest in the
stock. But this purchase, while perhaps representing a dominating
interest, did not involve actual control. Soon afterward, interests
identified with the Pennsylvania Railroad began to appear in the
Baltimore and Ohio, and before long the Pennsylvania had a strong
representation on the board. As a consequence, the Baltimore and Ohio
almost lost its individuality and for a time was popularly regarded
practically as a subsidiary of its old rival line.

The purpose of the Pennsylvania in obtaining this ascendency over the
Baltimore and Ohio was to regulate the soft coal traffic. Already it had
acquired dominating interests in the Chesapeake and Ohio, the Norfolk
and Western, and other soft coal properties. These purchases were merely
manifestations of that "community of interest" policy which at this
time led several large systems to acquire interests in competing lines.
Several of the railroad leaders of that time, notably James J. Hill and
Edward H. Harriman, believed that if these great systems actually
owned large blocks of stock in each other's properties, this common
association would ipso facto end the competition that, if continued,
would ultimately ruin them all. The Supreme Court had decided that the
"pooling" arrangements which had so long prevailed among great competing
roads violated the Sherman AntiTrust Act; and the American public, which
now was cultivating a new interest in railroad problems, believed that
the "community of interest" plan was merely a scheme to defeat the
Interstate Commerce Act and the Sherman Act and to maintain secretl