nded by a sort of
ravine over a steep hill called the Acraean cliff on which the
Syracusans had fortified themselves. After spending two days in vain
attempts to force this position, Nicias and Demosthenes resolved during
the night to strike off to the left towards the sea. But they were
overtaken, surrounded by superior forces, and compelled to surrender at
discretion. Out of the 40,000 who started from the camp only 10,000 at
the utmost were left at the end of the sixth day's march, the rest had
either deserted or been slain. The prisoners were sent to work in the
stone-quarries of Achradina and Epipolae. Here they were crowded
together without any shelter, and with scarcely provisions enough to
sustain life. The numerous bodies of those who died were left to
putrify where they had fallen, till at length the place became such an
intolerable centre of stench and infection that, at the end of seventy
days, the Syracusans, for their own comfort and safety, were obliged to
remove the survivors, who were sold as slaves. Nicias and Demosthenes
were condemned to death in spite of all the efforts of Gylippus and
Hermocrates to save them.

Such was the end of two of the largest and best appointed armaments
that had ever gone forth from Athens. Nicias, as we have seen, was
from the first opposed to the expedition in which they were employed,
as pregnant with the most dangerous consequences to Athens; and, though
it must be admitted that in this respect his views were sound, it
cannot at the same time be concealed that his own want of energy, and
his incompetence as a general, were the chief causes of the failure of
the undertaking. His mistakes involved the fall of Demosthenes, an
officer of far greater resolution and ability than himself, and who,
had his counsels been followed, would in all probability have conducted
the enterprise to a safe termination, though there was no longer room
to hope for success.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.--THIRD PERIOD, FROM THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION TO
THE END OF THE WAR, B.C. 413-404.

The destruction of the Sicilian armament was a fatal blow to the power
of Athens. It is astonishing that she was able to protract the war so
long with diminished strength and resources. Her situation inspired
her enemies with new vigour; states hitherto neutral declared against
her; her subject-allies prepared to throw off the yoke; even the
Persian satraps and the court of Susa bestirred