own ministers.
But the House of Commons had driven Clarendon, the Cabal, and
Danby successively from the direction of affairs. The theory of the
constitution was that the King alone had the power of making peace and
war. But the House of Commons had forced him to make peace with Holland,
and had all but forced him to make war with France. The theory of the
constitution was that the King was the sole judge of the cases in which
it might be proper to pardon offenders. Yet he was so much in dread
of the House of Commons that, at that moment, he could not venture to
rescue from the gallows men whom he well knew to be the innocent victims
of perjury.

Temple, it should seem, was desirous to secure to the legislature its
undoubted constitutional powers, and yet to prevent it, if
possible, from encroaching further on the province of the executive
administration. With this view he determined to interpose between the
sovereign and the Parliament a body which might break the shock of their
collision. There was a body ancient, highly honourable, and recognised
by the law, which, he thought, might be so remodelled as to serve this
purpose. He determined to give to the Privy Council a new character and
office in the government. The number of Councillors he fixed at thirty.
Fifteen of them were to be the chief ministers of state, of law, and of
religion. The other fifteen were to be unplaced noblemen and gentlemen
of ample fortune and high character. There was to be no interior
cabinet. All the thirty were to be entrusted with every political
secret, and summoned to every meeting; and the King was to declare that
he would, on every occasion, be guided by their advice.

Temple seems to have thought that, by this contrivance, he could at
once secure the nation against the tyranny of the Crown, and the Crown
against the encroachments of the Parliament. It was, on one hand, highly
improbable that schemes such as had been formed by the Cabal would
be even propounded for discussion in an assembly consisting of thirty
eminent men, fifteen of whom were bound by no tie of interest to the
court. On the other hand, it might be hoped that the Commons, content
with the guarantee against misgovernment which such a Privy Council
furnished, would confine themselves more than they had of late done
to their strictly legislative functions, and would no longer think it
necessary to pry into every part of the executive administration.

This plan, tho