ly to the requirements of the instructed taste of
the time; and under the guidance of the canon of pecuniary decency,
the men find the resulting artificially induced pathological features
attractive. So, for instance, the constricted waist which has had so
wide and persistent a vogue in the communities of the Western culture,
and so also the deformed foot of the Chinese. Both of these are
mutilations of unquestioned repulsiveness to the untrained sense. It
requires habituation to become reconciled to them. Yet there is no room
to question their attractiveness to men into whose scheme of life they
fit as honorific items sanctioned by the requirements of pecuniary
reputability. They are items of pecuniary and cultural beauty which have
come to do duty as elements of the ideal of womanliness.
The connection here indicated between the aesthetic value and the
invidious pecuniary value of things is of course not present in the
consciousness of the valuer. So far as a person, in forming a judgment
of taste, takes thought and reflects that the object of beauty under
consideration is wasteful and reputable, and therefore may legitimately
be accounted beautiful; so far the judgment is not a bona fide judgment
of taste and does not come up for consideration in this connection. The
connection which is here insisted on between the reputability and the
apprehended beauty of objects lies through the effect which the fact of
reputability has upon the valuer's habits of thought. He is in the
habit of forming judgments of value of various kinds-economic, moral,
aesthetic, or reputable concerning the objects with which he has to do,
and his attitude of commendation towards a given object on any other
ground will affect the degree of his appreciation of the object when he
comes to value it for the aesthetic purpose. This is more particularly
true as regards valuation on grounds so closely related to the aesthetic
ground as that of reputability. The valuation for the aesthetic purpose
and for the purpose of repute are not held apart as distinctly as might
be. Confusion is especially apt to arise between these two kinds of
valuation, because the value of objects for repute is not habitually
distinguished in speech by the use of a special descriptive term. The
result is that the terms in familiar use to designate categories
or elements of beauty are applied to cover this unnamed element of
pecuniary merit, and the corresponding confusion of i
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