haue charge of common wealths, to
the vttermost of their power ought to be fryends to traficke of
marchandise, and enimyes of heapynge treasure together, Prynces
haue so many people to please, and so greate numbre of crauers,
that if they keepe any thing for them, the same shall rather
seeme a spice of theft than of prouidence. To take away an other
man's goodes, truly is a wycked part: but if it bee permitted to
take Treasure, better it were to take it out of the Temples,
than to defraude the people: for the one is consecrated to the
immortall Gods, and the other to the pore commons. I speake this
(right honorable fathers) to put you in remembraunce, and also
to aduise you, that you take good heede to the goodes of the
common wealth, howe they bee dyspended, howe gathered together,
howe they bee kepte, and howe they be employed. For ye ought to
vnderstand, that the goodes of the Common wealth be committed to
you in trust, not to the ende yee shoulde enioy them, but rather
by good gouernement to vse them. We do heare that the Walles be
ready to fal, the Towers be in decay, and the Temples in great
ruine, wherof we be not a lyttle offended, and you ought also to
be ashamed, for so mutch as the damages and detryments of the
Common wealth, we ought eyther to remedy, or else to lament. Ye
haue wrytten vnto mee to know my pleasure, whether the censors,
pretors, and ediles should be yearely chosen, and not
perpetuall, as hitherto they haue bene: and specyally you say,
that the state of the Dictators (which is the greatest and
highest dignity in Rome) is onely but for sixe moneths. To that
I aunswer, that we are wel contented wyth that aduyse: for not
wythout cause and iust reason our predecessours dyd abolyshe the
fyrst kynges of Rome, and ordayned, that the Consuls should
yearely be chosen in the Common wealthe. Whych was done, in
consyderation that hee whych had perpetuall gouernement, many
tymes became insolente and proude. And therefore that the
charges and offices of the Senate, should be yearely, to auoyde
danger, which if they should be perpetual there myght ensue
great hurt and damage to the common wealth: for if the Officers
beyng yerely chosen, be good, they may be continued: and if they
bee euyll, they may be chaunged. And truely the officer, whych
knoweth that vpon the end of euery yeare he must be chaunged and
examined of his charge, he wyll take good heede to that whych he
speaketh, and first of all wil consi