is capable of
from two to ten different senses. So that, by changing the sense of
only a single word at a time, several thousands of different
constitutions would be made. But this is not all. Variations could
also be made by changing the senses of two or more words at a time,
and these variations could be run through all the changes and
combinations of senses that these thousand words are capable of. We
see, then, that it is no more than a literal truth, that out of that
single instrument, as it now stands, without altering the location of
a single word, might be formed, by construction and interpretation,
more different constitutions than figures can well estimate.

But each written law, in order to be a law, must be taken only in
some _one_ definite and distinct sense; and that definite and
distinct sense must be selected from the almost infinite variety of
senses which its words are capable of. How is this selection to be
made? It can be only by the aid of that perception of natural law, or
natural justice, which men naturally possess.

Such, then, is the comparative certainty of the natural and the
written law. Nearly all the certainty there is in the latter, so far
as it relates to principles, is based upon, and derived from, the
still greater certainty of the former. In fact, nearly all the
uncertainty of the laws under which we live,--which are a mixture of
natural and written laws,--arises from the difficulty of construing,
or, rather, from the facility of misconstruing, the _written_ law;
while natural law has nearly or quite the same certainty as
mathematics. On this point, Sir William Jones, one of the most
learned judges that have ever lived, learned in Asiatic as well as
European law, says,--and the fact should be kept forever in mind, as
one of the most important of all truths:--"_It is pleasing to remark
the similarity, or, rather, the identity of those conclusions which
pure, unbiassed reason, in all ages and nations, seldom fails to
draw, in such juridical inquiries as are not fettered and manacled by
positive institutions._"[76] In short, the simple fact that the
written law must be interpreted by the natural, is, of itself, a
sufficient confession of the superior certainty of the latter.

The written law, then, even where it can be construed consistently
with the natural, introduces labor an