tering justice according to their own
ideas of it_, is not only shown by the extracts already given, but is
explicitly acknowledged in the following one, in which the _modern
"courts of conscience"_ are compared with the _ancient hundred and
county courts_, and the preference given to the latter, on the ground
that the duties of the jurors in the one case, and of the commissioners
in the other, are the same, and that the consciences of a jury are a
safer and purer tribunal than the consciences of individuals specially
appointed, and holding permanent offices.

"But there is one species of courts constituted by act of Parliament,
in the city of London, and other trading and populous districts,
which, in their proceedings, so vary from the course of the common
law, that they deserve a more particular consideration. I mean the
court of requests, _or courts of conscience_, for the recovery of
small debts. The first of these was established in London so early as
the reign of Henry VIII., by an act of their common council; which,
however, was certainly insufficient for that purpose, and illegal,
till confirmed by statute 3 Jac. I., ch. 15, which has since been
explained and amended by statute 14 Geo. II., ch. 10. The
constitution is this: two aldermen and four commoners sit twice a
week to hear all causes of debt not exceeding the value of forty
shillings; which they examine in a summary way, by the oath of the
parties or other witnesses, _and make such order therein as is
consonant to equity and good conscience_.* * Divers trading towns and
other districts have obtained acts of Parliament, for establishing
in them _courts of conscience_ upon nearly the same plan as that in
the city of London.

"The anxious desire that has been shown to obtain these several acts,
proves clearly that the nation, in general, is truly sensible of the
great inconvenience arising from the disuse of the ancient county and
hundred courts, wherein causes of this small value were always
formerly decided with very little trouble and expense to the parties.
But it is to be feared that the general remedy, which of late hath
been principally applied to this inconvenience, (the erecting these
new jurisdictions,) may itself be attended in time with very ill
consequences; as the method of proceeding therein is entirely in
derogation of the common law; and their large discret