lisation than the other. At
one period toleration would destroy society; at another, persecution is
fatal to liberty. The theory of intolerance is wrong only if founded
absolutely upon religious motives; but even then the practice of it is
not necessarily censurable. It is opposed to the Christian spirit, in
the same manner as slavery is opposed to it. The Church prohibits
neither intolerance nor slavery, though in proportion as her influence
extends, and civilisation advances, both gradually disappear.

Unity and liberty are the only legitimate principles on which the
position of a Church in a State can be regulated, but the distance
between them is immeasurable, and the transition extremely difficult. To
pass from religious unity to religious liberty is to effect a complete
inversion in the character of the State, a change in the whole spirit of
legislation, and a still greater revolution in the minds and habits of
men. So great a change seldom happens all at once. The law naturally
follows the condition of society, which does not suddenly change. An
intervening stage from unity to liberty, a compromise between toleration
and persecution, is a common but irrational, tyrannical, and impolitic
arrangement. It is idle to talk of the guilt of persecution, if we do
not distinguish the various principles on which religious dissent can be
treated by the State. The exclusion of other religions--- the system of
Spain, of Sweden, of Mecklenburg, Holstein, and Tyrol--is reasonable in
principle, though practically untenable in the present state of European
society. The system of expulsion or compulsory conformity, adopted by
Lewis XIV. and the Emperor Nicholas, is defensible neither on religious
nor political grounds. But the system applied to Ireland, which uses
religious disabilities for the purpose of political oppression,[325]
stands alone in solitary infamy among the crimes and follies of the
rulers of men.

The acquisition of real definite freedom is a very slow and tardy
process. The great social independence enjoyed in the early periods of
national history is not yet political freedom. The State has not yet
developed its authority, or assumed the functions of government. A
period follows when all the action of society is absorbed by the ruling
power, when the license of early times is gone, and the liberties of a
riper age are not yet acquired. These liberties are the product of a
long conflict with absolutism, and of a