n owner of the being and
operations of the creatures; and that was enough of obligation to bind all
flesh, that the Creator is lawgiver, that he who gives a being doth set
bounds and limits to the exercise and use of that being. But it pleased
the Lord, in his infinite goodness and love, to add a promise and
threatening to that law and command, and so turns it to the nature of a
voluntary covenant and agreement, whereby he doth mitigate and sweeten his
authority and power, and condescends so low to man as to take on himself a
greater obligation than he puts upon man, "Do this, and thou shalt live."
He might then, out of his absoluteness and power, have required at the
creature's hand any terms he pleased, even the hardest which could be
imagined, and yet no injustice in him. He might have put laws on men to
restrain all their natural liberty, and in every thing, to proclaim
nothing but his own supremacy. But O what goodness and condescension is
even in the very matter of the law; and then in the manner of prescribing
it with a promise! In the matter, so just and equitable to convince all
men's consciences, yea, even engraven on their hearts, that he lays not
many burdens on, but what men's consciences must lay on themselves; that
there is nothing in it all, when summed up, harder than this,--love God
most of all, and thy neighbour as thyself, which all men must proclaim to
be due, though it had not been required; and but one precept added by his
mere will, which yet was so easy a thing, as it was a wonder the Lord of
all put no other conditions on the creatures. And then for the manner;
that it is propounded covenant-wise, with a promise, not to expect the
creature's consent--for it did not depend on his acceptation, he being
bound to accept any terms his Lord propounded--but because the matter and
all was so equitable, and the conditions so ample, that if it had been
propounded to any rational man, he would have consented with an admiration
at God's goodness. Indeed, if we speak strictly, there cannot be a proper
covenant between God and man,--there is such an infinite distance between
such unequal parties, our obedience and performance being absolutely in
his power. We cannot promise it as our own, and it being but our duty, we
cannot crave or expect a reward in justice, neither can he owe any thing
to the creature. Yet it pleased his majesty to propound it in these terms,
and to stoop so low unto men's capacities, and,