sary to put down the
rebellion; and though no power is given him to appoint Governors over
the States in ordinary times, it _is_ given him, indirectly, but as
surely as if expressly granted, to be used in times of actual war, by
the clause of the Constitution which we have just quoted, making him
commander-in-chief of the national military force. Whenever the States,
or any of them, cease to be debatable ground--that is, when the military
force of the rebellion is put down, the military necessity ceases, and
with it the authority of the President to appoint military governors.
Nor is there danger of encroaching upon the liberties of the nation;
for, as the power attaches to the President, not in his capacity as the
civil head of the nation, but as the military commander-in-chief, it
ceases the moment military opposition is overcome. The fear of the
_Atlantic_ author would seem to be ill grounded, for we cannot believe
that any military force could be raised by a despotic executive who
might endeavor to place himself in absolute power, and we think there is
little danger that the Government may 'crystallize into a military
despotism.' Would supplies be granted by Congress; or, if granted, would
not the people of a country which has sprung to arms only to defend a
_free_ government, be strong enough to resist any single military
despot? Let the history of the present rebellion, in which a population
of only eight millions, and that in the least defensible States of the
Union, has resisted for nearly three years the combined power of all the
other States, with a population of more than twenty millions, answer the
question. The _Atlantic_ writer admits the propriety of appointing
military governors in the cases of Mexico and California before the
latter was admitted as a State, but denies it in the cases of the rebel
States, because they are States, and therefore (as he says) within the
civil jurisdiction. But at the period to which we refer, Congress had
jurisdiction over both California and Mexico by the express provision of
the Constitution (art. iv. sec. 3), 'the Congress shall have power to
dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations concerning the
territory or other property belonging to the United States.' If, then,
the power of the President be admitted in the two cases referred to, it
is even stronger in the cases of the rebel States, where no such power
is given to Congress. And further it would seem that