erous middle and upper groups of farmers, and those
remaining capitalists who either through their economic or through
their _political_ position have no cause to be alarmed at the present
concentration of capital. Against the collectivist tendency will be all
those capitalists who want to compete with trusts, city landlords, and
real estate dealers, and financial magnates whose power consists largely
in their control over the wealth of inactive large capitalists or small
investors.

Kautsky has begun to see that a progressive capitalistic policy _may_
take hold of the professional and salaried classes in Germany; he would
probably not deny that in many other countries it is being taken up by
certain groups of capitalists also, and that this same tendency may soon
be seen in Germany. And when it is, the German Socialists will obviously
be less anxious about the fate of much-needed reforms, will find
themselves able more frequently to trust these reforms to capitalistic
progressives, and will give themselves over more largely than ever to
the direct preparation of the masses for the overthrow of capitalist
government.

That is to say, the Socialist movement, like all the other forces of
individual and social life, becomes more aggressive as it becomes
stronger--and it is, indeed, inexplicable how the opposite view has
spread among its opponents.

Not only does it seem that the German movement is showing little or no
tendency to relax the radical nature of its demands, but it does not
appear that its enemies are, for the present at least, to be given the
satisfaction of seeing even a minority split off from the main body.
That a split may occur in the future is not improbable, but if the
movement continues to grow as it has grown, it can afford to lose many
minorities, just as it has suffered comparatively little damage from the
desertion of several prominent individual figures.

It is true that the division of opinion in the Party might now be
sharper but for the artificial unity created by the great fight for a
more democratic form of government that lies immediately ahead. If the
needed reforms are granted without any very revolutionary proceedings on
the part of the Socialists, as similar reforms were granted in Austria,
the Party might then conceivably divide into two parts, in which case it
is probable that a majority of the four million Socialist _voters_ might
go with the anti-revolutionist and reform wing, bu