and in the methods existing
therein which were inherited from the times of profound peace.

Shortly after my installation as Chief of Staff I adopted the principle
of interchange of the personnel of the various staff corps of the War
Department with men who had training in France, and in the application
of this principle placed as the heads of various bureaus officers
selected on account of their ability and experience in the system of
warfare as conducted in France.

At this time, also, I found that the divisions organized in our armies
were still regarded as separate units, designated by different titles in
accordance with their origin. This made three different kinds of
divisions in the United States army--the Regular army, the National
Guard, and National army divisions. All these distinctions were
abolished and the entire army consolidated into a United States army,
without regard to the source from which drawn. The source of supply of
all replacements for the various elements of the army, without regard to
their origin, was drafted men; and the titles had no significance
whatever and were a source of possible disturbance from the standpoint
of military efficiency. There was, in fact, no actual difference between
these divisions with respect to efficiency--all have done high-grade
work from whatever source drawn. All have shown courage and capacity for
quick absorption of the fundamentals of modern military training and
irresistible dash and force in actual fighting.

When I returned from France on March 1, 1918, I came back with the
belief that the most fundamental necessity, both for the American
Expeditionary Force and for the success of the allies, was that the
shipment of troops to France should be vastly increased and should have
priority over everything else; and as this policy became effective a
study was instituted looking to our putting in France, if that was
possible, enough men to bring the war to a conclusion in the shortest
period possible. After a study of the entire situation, including as
accurate an estimate of the potential strength of our allies on the
western front and of the probable German strength as was possible, I
came to the conclusion that the war might be brought to an end in 1919,
provided we were able to land in France by June 30th of that year eighty
American divisions of a strength of 3,360,000 men. On July 18, 1918, I
submitted to you a formal memorandum, accompanied by a study o