ultiplicity of
problems that have arisen.

ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING

After a thorough consideration of allied organizations it was decided
that our combat division should consist of four regiments of infantry of
3,000 men, with three battalions to regiment and four companies of 250
men each to a battalion, and of an artillery brigade of three regiments,
a machine-gun battalion, an engineer regiment, a trench-mortar battery,
a signal battalion, wagon trains, and the headquarters staffs and
military police. These, with medical and other units, made a total of
over 28,000 men, or practically double the size of a French or German
division. Each corps would normally consist of six divisions--four
combat and one depot and one replacement division--and also two
regiments of cavalry, and each army of from three to five corps. With
four divisions fully trained, a corps could take over an American sector
with two divisions in line and two in reserve, with the depot and
replacement divisions prepared to fill the gaps in the ranks.

Our purpose was to prepare an integral American force, which should be
able to take the offensive in every respect. Accordingly, the
development of a self-reliant infantry by thorough drill in the use of
the rifle and in the tactics of open warfare was always uppermost. The
plan of training after arrival in France allowed a division one month
for acclimatization and instruction in small units from battalions down,
a second month in quiet trench sectors by battalion, and a third month
after it came out of the trenches when it should be trained as a
complete division in war of movement....

ARTILLERY, AIRPLANES, AND TANKS

Our entry into the war found us with few of the auxiliaries necessary
for its conduct in the modern sense. Among our most important
deficiencies in material were artillery, aviation, and tanks. In order
to meet our requirements as rapidly as possible, we accepted the offer
of the French Government to provide us with the necessary artillery
equipment of seventy-fives, one fifty-five millimeter howitzers, and one
fifty-five G P F guns from their own factories for thirty divisions. The
wisdom of this course is fully demonstrated by the fact that, although
we soon began the manufacture of these classes of guns at home, there
were no guns of the calibers mentioned manufactured in America on our
front at the date the armistice was signed. The only guns of these types
produced at h